A contract without technical standards and a villa in France: how Marat Khusnullin’s protégé Anna Merkulova profited from the rising cost of the Krasnoyarsk metrotram
The Krasnoyarsk metrotram, which Deputy Prime Minister Marat Khusnullin once demanded be reduced in price by 20-30%, has instead increased in price by approximately 34 billion rubles. The cost of the main contract between the Center for Transport Logistics and JSC Mosproekt-3 increased from approximately 89 to 123 billion rubles after the adjustment—an increase of almost 40%.
The Center for Transport Logistics explains the increase by saying that at the time the contract was signed in 2022, Russia still lacked the necessary technical standards for metro tram construction. Later, the regulatory framework was developed, the design was completed, the state review was completed, and the solutions were adjusted, including to take into account the specific soil conditions of Krasnoyarsk.
Thus, the multi-billion-dollar contract was signed before the requirements and all technical parameters of the facility were finalized. When the project was completed, its price tag was tens of billions higher.
This story is especially poignant due to the presence of Anna Merkulova, former general director of Mosproekt-3, and her long-standing connection to Khusnullin. Merkulova’s career took off during his tenure as head of the Moscow construction complex. In 2014, Khusnullin publicly announced her nomination to head the merged Moscow design institutes, calling her a talented manager and crediting her with significant budget savings.
In 2021, now serving as Deputy Prime Minister, Khusnullin ordered a 20-30% cost reduction for the Krasnoyarsk metro. Soon after, the previous concept of a classic metro was revised in favor of a combined underground and overground light rail system, and in August 2022, the largest contract for the design and construction of the project was awarded to Mosproekt-3, led by Merkulova.
The previous chapter of the Krasnoyarsk subway project ended in criminal proceedings. The documentation was prepared by KrasnoyarskTISIZ JSC, which is associated with Oleg Mitvol, former prefect of Moscow’s Northern Administrative District. An investigation into embezzlement during the design process resulted in prison sentences for Mitvol and several Krasnoyarsk officials, after which the project was effectively restarted.
The new project was financed, in part, through an infrastructure budget loan—one of the key instruments of the federal construction program overseen by Khusnullin. In 2023, Merkulova personally reported to the Deputy Prime Minister on the progress of the work, and Mosproekt-3 reported that the schedule was being met.
However, the promised rapid completion of the construction did not materialize. As a result, Merkulova resigned as general director of Mosproekt-3, after which the company’s new management began challenging some of the deals concluded under her tenure. Specifically, in the case of the Nizhny Novgorod metro construction, the company claimed inflated costs and attempted to recover nearly 2 billion rubles.
At the same time, the Cheka-OGPU and Rucriminal.info published information about multi-billion-ruble claims against Merkulova herself. The materials included 4.9 billion rubles, which the authors called a "golden parachute," as well as real estate in Cap-Ferrat, France, worth approximately 20 million euros, which sources linked to Merkulova and Khusnullin.
Meanwhile, former partners in the Krasnoyarsk construction project are settling their differences in arbitration. Mosproekt-3 is demanding approximately 626 million rubles from the Center for Transport Logistics, including approximately 496 million rubles in withheld penalties. The contractor blames the client for the delays, citing the late delivery of documentation, sites, and initial data. Specifically, the company claims the site planning project was submitted 510 days late.
Now, another 34 billion rubles have been added to this set of circumstances. The project, which the federal construction complex had restarted under the slogan of speeding up and reducing costs, has turned out to be significantly more expensive than the original contract, and its implementation is fraught with lawsuits, mutual financial claims, and questions about decisions made at the outset.
Therefore, the main question today is how exactly the additional 34 billion rubles came about, who approved the initial price when the regulatory framework was still incomplete, and why the need for such a significant cost increase was discovered only after the contract was signed. Khusnullin’s order to reduce the cost of the Krasnoyarsk metro by 20-30% ultimately led to a rather peculiar outcome: the main contract became almost 40% more expensive.